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Abstract
This study analyzes the relationship between voter age and party affiliation with political
polarization in the form of feelings towards both one’s own party and the opposing party. Using
data from the 2020 American National Election Survey, the favorability ratings of voters from
both parties towards both their own party and the opposing party were analyzed and grouped
based on voter age. The results of this analysis indicate that positive feelings towards one’s own
party and negative feelings towards the opposing party, and therefore polarization, tend to
increase as age increases.
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Introduction
Political polarization, although it has always existed in the American political system, has
been on the rise in recent years (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal 2006). The most visible aspect of
this polarization is apparent in the inability for the political elites of both parties to agree on the
largest issues facing the nation today. The COVID-19 pandemic is an excellent example of a
botched federal response that sourced from a failure from the parties to agree on its severity
(Jacobson 2020). This pattern is likely to continue should polarization continue unabated, as the
current trends seem to indicate.
The effects of polarization however are not isolated to national politics. Even the daily
lives of citizens can become tainted by this phenomenon. Political “affective polarization”, or the
attributing of negative characteristics, such as laziness or hatefulness, to members of the
opposing party can also occur (Iyengar et. al. 2018). This characterization can have tangible
impacts on the lives of these individuals and their relationships. Social relationships with
members of other political persuasions for example have become more uncomfortable to these
partisans (Iyengar et. al. 2018). Moreover, research also indicates that even residential
preferences have become more politicized as well, with one study arguing that residents tend to
view locations with larger numbers of co-partisans more positively (Gimpel & Hui 2015). These
self-selecting behaviors and unease towards members of opposing political views is not
beneficial within a society that works based upon bipartisanship and compromise.
In the study of political polarization, the primary source of this growing polarization is
still uncertain, as there is still a disagreement between research focusing on both a fundamental
ideological divide (Graham, Nosek, & Haidt 2012) and a psychological partisan division (Mason
2015). Furthermore, there are still various aspects of this growing polarization that are still
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unexplored. By focusing on one specific aspect of political polarization, that aspect being the
potential for a difference in polarization along generational lines, one small part of the greater
question can be answered. This will in addition allow for further direction regarding future
research into both the primary question of polarization as well as adjacent questions related to
the breadth and source of this polarization.
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Literature Review
Political polarization, as the term suggests, is the increasing political segmentation of
both people and ideas onto the extreme ends of the political spectrum. These people and ideas
can include party platforms, political elites, as well as the mass public itself. As this polarization
continues, it begins to manifest itself in ways that can affect both the political process itself as
well as in daily lives. One such example is the adoption of negative perceptions of the character
of members of different political groups (Iyengar et. al. 2018). Even the perceptions of the public
that significant polarization between political parties is occurring can affect the political system
by, for example, increasing political participation (Wang & Shen 2018). Thus, the effects of such
polarization are real and can affect the political process in several ways.
Political Polarization – Current Trends
Overall, political polarization in America has been shown to have increased over the last
several years (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal 2006). This political polarization of America is
reflected in the polarization of the political parties themselves. While this polarization has not
affected both parties to the same degree, both have still moved further to their respective ends of
the political spectrum (Hertel-Fernandez, Hacker, & Pierson 2019). In addition to political
parties, polarization among the American public and elites is also apparent. Abramowitz and
Saunders note this increase in ideological polarization in both the public and elites, further
mentioning that these divisions are widespread and not limited to only the most politically
interested (2008). These descriptions demonstrate how pervasive political polarization is in
American society at all levels and has implications as to the effects of such polarization, given its
ubiquity.
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One conventional way to think about this polarization in America is to view the
Republican Party as moving towards the right, with the Democratic Party moving towards the
left. When considering the individuals of each party, this definition makes sense, as the
ideological makeup of the parties themselves have become more homogeneous over time (Ridout
et. al. 2018). This phenomenon is called political sorting, or the “sorting” of individuals into
parties that align more so with their own political preferences. Research from Ridout et. al.
(2018) notes that those who label themselves liberal or conservative are more and more likely to
join the political party that they believe to be “correct”. This has thus led to a basis of fact for the
common assumption that if one is a “liberal”, they are a member of the Democratic party, with
the same being said for conservatives and the Republican party.
The political sorting of the two primary American political parties has an extensive
history. After the Civil War and the reunification of the North and the South, the Democratic
Party became a coalition of northern liberals and southern conservatives (Heersink 2017). This
coalition was tested over time due to the northern liberal’s pursuance of civil rights legislation,
legislation which was in direct opposition to the interests of Dixiecrats, or southern Democratic
conservatives (Heersink 2017). Despite these fundamental differences in party policy, political
leaders within the Democratic party continued to work to keep this coalition of disparate groups
together.
Just as the Democratic Party was attempting to keep their coalition together, the
Republican Party was eyeing this new opportunity. In 1957, the Republican National Convention
launched Operation Dixie to capture disillusioned southern conservative Democrats (Heersink
2017). This strategy was not an immediate success, but eventually paid off in the 1968 election
of Richard Nixon, who was able to convince the south through a strategy of “law and order”
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rather than one based upon segregation (Heersink 2017). Since this time, southern conservatives
have generally voted in favor of the Republican Party. While the Democrats attempted to
downplay civil rights between 1952 and 1958 to woo the Dixiecrats back to their party, they
were ultimately unsuccessful. After this realization, the Democratic Party fully embraced Civil
Rights, and pushed for the removal of the so-called Dixiecrats from the party, in favor of African
American voters (Heersink 2017).
Nixon’s “Southern Strategy”, as it became to be known, was not isolated to this one
victory. Other Republican presidents, from Reagan to both Bush’s, have also employed this
strategy (Brown 2004). School segregation is one example of this continued Southern Strategy
that has manifested itself in differing forms in American politics over time. For example, while
Nixon argued that he was not strictly against the school desegregation decision of Brown v.
Board, he was not interested on insisting for Brown’s rapid implementation (Heersink 2017).
Ronald Reagan, in his continuance of these policies, decried the support Democrats showed
towards the practice of busing, calling it a “social experiment that nobody wants” (Brown 2004).
More recently, Republican politicians have argued for the allowance of school vouchers, which
are usually argued to promote school choice, but generally tend to instead increase school
segregation practices (Brown 2004). Overall, policies of school voucher programs and others
work towards the goal of keeping conservative voters within the Republican Party, and thus
work to keep the parties polarized.
Age and Political Polarization
Age and politics are two realms that are popularly connected, based upon the dichotomy
of liberalism/conservatism in American politics. A common refrain regarding this connection
states that young people who are not liberals have no heart, whereas those who are older and are
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not conservative have no brain (Peterson, Smith, & Hibbing 2020). While this refrain is perhaps
a bit more complicated than this simple statement, as Peterson, Smith, and Hibbing (2020) found
a greater trend among those who kept consistent political views throughout their lives than
changed them, those who did drift towards the left or right did tend to move more so
conservative than liberal. Therefore, it would not be inaccurate to say that on average, people are
more likely to become more conservative than liberal as they age. However, it is still important
to note that overall, partisan stability does remain overwhelmingly stable when related to age
(Green, Palmquist, & Schickler 2002).
Furthermore, research into why most people tend to stick with their own type of
partisanship as they age has also been conducted. Hobbes (2019) found that one potential source
for this consistent link between partisanship and age is social and personal environmental
stability. This finding was contrasted with further results indicating that slight life instability
increases could lead to party-switching (Hobbes 2019). Thus, partisan stability itself is strong
throughout the US, as found by Peterson, Smith, and Hibbing (2020), and the source for this
stability likely in part originates from enduring social and environmental connections.
Political Polarization – Research on Source
The research behind the source of political polarization contains a fundamental fracture in
the reasons behind its manifestation. This division primarily can be viewed in the difference
between ideological polarization and psychological polarization. These two areas of research
then tend to focus on different phenomena to explain how this polarization occurs. Generally,
ideological research will focus on divisions in the electorate that are issue driven. In contrast,
psychological research into polarization will focus on group bias. Both areas of research need to
be addressed when looking into any topic related to polarization.
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Political Polarization: Ideological
The first primary area of political polarization research argues that the source of this
division comes primarily through actual political disagreements that have simply enlarged over
time. For example, research focusing on why both liberals and conservatives believe the other
side to be immoral found that this belief stems from a fundamental difference in how members
from each group view the world (Graham, Nosek, & Haidt 2012). As these divisions are based
upon actual differences in policy opinions, the sources of these divisions are argued to come
from metrics that include tangible differences, such as economic class (Evans 1993). These
differences are thus included within the social system before politics is even considered, and thus
reflect actual, real-world disagreements based upon these systems.
One such consideration is the link between class and political polarization. Research by
Evans for example indicates that middle-class and lower-class individuals, when faced with
feelings of “powerlessness”, correlates with political movement to the right and the left,
respectively (1993). This research thus offers support to the assertion that, under specific
circumstances, economic class can have an impact on the polarization of voting patterns of the
electorate. This polarization seems to be limited only to these specific instances, however. Other
research by Dettrey and Campbell for instance argues that overall, the growing ideological
political polarization is not the result of economic class disparities, but instead due to a growing
divide between political parties (2013).
Political Polarization: Psychological
The second primary area of political polarization research argues that these divisions are
not primarily created by policy differences but are psychological, tribal differences that go
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beyond rational disagreement over policy. These researchers argue that both sides overall agree,
or do not significantly differ, on most political issues, and that the divisions in politics arise
instead as a byproduct of the partisanship in the political process (Mason 2015). These divisions
tend to come from sources that are more intangible and psychological, rather than actual social
divisions. Party identification and identity politics are some examples of how this polarization
occurs in ways that emphasize the psychological polarization that occurs more due to the group
membership of the individual rather than the wants and needs of the party member (Mason &
Wronski 2018). In this way, the divisions are psychologically perceived, rather than actual
divisions based on policy.
Support for the argument that political polarization is sourced in psychological
perceptions can be found in research on the relationship between political choices and
psychological processes. Taber and Lodge (2016) studied how political decision making was
related to three different psychological phenomena, these phenomena being hot cognition, or
sudden judgements of political objects based upon quickly occurring feelings , affect transfer, or
the transfer of these judgements to feelings of political candidates, and affect cognition, or the
creation of biased thought processes resulting from the creation of these prior unconscious
connections. Finding support for each of these three phenomena, Taber and Lodge argue that
political support for candidates, parties, and policies is less the result of rational thought, but
instead primarily the result of affect (2016). One’s decisions about a politician or policy are thus
both first and primarily conceptualized through these unconscious connections (Taber & Lodge
2016). This research thereby provides strong support for the argument that psychology is the
prime motivator for political polarization.
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The psychological bias resulting from these phenomena can manifest in several different
ways. One such way regards the impact of identity politics on political polarization. Identity
politics is political activity that is motivated primarily by the social groups one aligns themselves
with rather than any ideological principals one holds (Mason & Wronski 2018). This focus on
group membership can include any social or political group one believes themselves to be
identified with, hence the term “identity”. Consequentially, those whose participation in politics
is primarily motivated in this way may hold and act out for values and ideologies that seem to be
contradictory. This type of political affiliation thus increases political polarization between
parties, as the primary motivating goal becomes the furtherance of the party’s agenda, and
compromise is seen as unacceptable.
Linked to identity politics, a more recent development of political polarization is the
phenomena of affective polarization. This type of polarization is defined by the negative
attributes’ members of one political party or orientation will attribute towards the other political
group (Iyengar et. al. 2018). For example, one may be more likely to view members of the
opposing political party as generally hateful or lacking intellect. This type of polarization has
further reaching effects than simply the realm of politics, as this negative view of fellow citizens
can color perceptions and relations in day-to-day life. Furthermore, these negative views can
aggravate the negative effects of polarization on political discourse, as the public may be less
willing to engage those on the other side of the political spectrum if they view them as unable or
unwilling to compromise or think rationally. This type of polarization also discourages political
parties themselves to bridge the gap between their respective bases, as their own base becomes
apathetic towards the goals of the other party.
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The strength of this affective polarization has been argued to be tied to one’s own
perceptions of partisan identity. One study on the topic of political dehumanization found
support for this argument, indicating that individuals who displayed stronger partisan identities
were more likely to dehumanize political opponents (Cassese 2021). In the study, Cassese found
support for the hypothesis that individuals would rate their own party as more human than the
opposing party (Cassese 2021). This finding indicates both positive and negative partisanship, as
this disparity indicates both that one’s own party is generally viewed positively as more human,
whereas the opposing party is viewed negatively and inhuman. Furthermore, this dehumanization
was shown to cross party lines. While the study did find that Republicans overall had a larger
humanization disparity between the GOP and Democratic Party, the study still showed clear
distinctions between in party and out party humanization ratings from members of both parties
(Cassese 2021). Thus, hyper-partisans who are more likely to display additional severe traits of
affective polarization are not limited to one side of the aisle.
One further similar concept to identity politics is negative partisanship. Like identity
politics, negative partisanship concerns the alignment of oneself with political groups. However,
while identity politics generally deals with alignment with a group, negative partisanship
concerns party alignment against a group. This type of partisanship can be seen in the feelings of
party members towards both their own party and own party candidates, feelings which have
declined over the last several years (Abramowitz & Webster 2018). This growing movement that
pushes against parties rather than for causes has led to some specific consequences, such as an
increase in straight-ticket voting (Abramowitz & Webster 2018). Much like identity politics,
negative partisanship thereby can also lead to activities that source more so from psychological
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origins (in this case, as wish to oppose a particular party), rather than conscious effort to further
particular policies.
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Hypothesis & Model
The primary independent variable for this paper is the age of an individual. For the
purposes of this paper, the four groupings to be used will include respondents under the age of
30, those aged 30 to 45, those aged 46 to 60, and respondents over 60. A further independent
variable used is the party identification of the individual. These three variables will be coded as
Republican, Independent, or Democrat, based upon this affiliation.
As the aim of this paper is to define the relationship between political polarization and
generational differences, the dependent variable will need to reflect a distinction in political
polarization. This reflection of political polarization will be sourced from two questions from the
survey used, each of which asks respondents of their feelings towards the Republicans and
Democrats. These responses are coded on a 0 to 10 scale, with responses of 0 indicating a strong
dislike of the party, and responses of 10 indicating a strong like of the party.
The hypothesis used for this study must reflect a correlation between the age of a party
member and their feelings towards both their own party and the opposing party. Thus, the two
hypotheses for this project are as follows:
-

Older voters will be more likely to hold negative views of the opposing party than
younger voters.

-

Older voters will be more likely to hold positive views of their own party than
younger voters.

For both hypotheses, the use of political party is used as a reflection of political polarization.
An increase of political polarization then is hypothesized to hold a positive relationship with
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favorability of one’s own party, and a negative relationship with favorability of the opposing
political party.
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Research Design
This project will utilize the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2020 Times
Series Study. The study contains a collection of survey responses from the period surrounding
the 2020 election, containing responses from two waves of surveys conducted both before and
after the election. These responses were collected from a cross-section of U.S. eligible voters,
who were reached by the web, video, and phone. These responses numbered at 5,441 preelection interviews, and 4,783 post-election interviews. In addition, two waves of pre- and postelection surveys were carried out to 2016 ANES respondents by way of the internet. These
responses were less numerous, numbering 2,839 and 2,670 pre- and post-election responses,
respectively. The questions asked in the survey covered a range of topics related to current
events, such as how the COVID-19 pandemic was handled and how urban unrest should be
handled by the public, in addition to a host of demographics questions. These responses were
responded to primarily in a multiple-choice fashion, with open-ended responses to these
questions being redacted.
By taking a cross-section of U.S. voters, this survey ensures that its respondents include a
reliably representative sample of the views of voters across the country. This methodology has
better generalizability than a survey conducted only containing respondents clustered within a
specific geographic location, as such as a survey would likely not reflect values held in different
areas of the US. This survey is thus considered representative of the whole of active American
voters, allowing the results of the survey to be used to generalize out to the overall U.S. active
voting public.
There is one potential limitation with this methodology. This limitation concerns the use
of video, phone, and internet interviews as the primary method of collecting survey responses.
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While these methods would reach an overwhelming majority of American voters, it would not be
able to reach those without these methods of communication. This has the potential of missing
active voters who are less likely to have access to these means of communication. Second, is the
potential impact on responses when a survey is administered face-to-face. The survey notes that,
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, no in-person interviews were conducted. As such, surveys were
administered through three different randomly assigned modes: web only, web and phone, or
web, video, and phone. These varying methods of survey distribution have the potential of also
impacting survey responses.
Six tests will be taken to fully assess the hypothesis. The first three tests will concern the
feelings of respondents towards the Democratic Party, separated by the respondent’s own party
affiliation, being coded as either Republican, Democrat, or Independent. The use of Republicans
and Democrats in these tests working as test groups, and the Independent group working as a
control group. Each test will have four categories, one for each age group variable. These
responses will then be averaged based upon the 0 to 10 scale used in the survey and included
with a 95% confidence interval. This same process will then be repeated for the next three tests
using a second question concerning feelings of respondents towards the Republican Party, with
the same categories and party affiliations being used as in the first three tests.

19

Analysis
Test 1: Democrat Feeling Towards Democratic Party
The first test measured the feelings of respondents who self-identified as Democrats
towards the Democratic Party. In the survey, 3,344 responses were recorded within this criterion.
These responses were then divided into four categories each dependent upon the age of the
respondent, and a mean estimation with a 95% confidence interval was taken of this data set. The
result of this data showed a mean of 7.29 favorability for respondents under 30, a 7.35
favorability for those aged 30 and 45, a 7.83 favorability for those aged 46 to 60, and an 8.39
favorability of respondents aged over 60. Overall, these results showed significantly favorable
views of Democrats towards the Democratic Party. These results indicate a gradual increase in
own-party favorability among Democrats as the age of the respondent increased. Data for Test 1
is listed under Appendix A.
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Test 2: Independent Feeling Towards Democratic Party
The second test measured the feelings of respondents who self-identified as Independents
towards the Democratic Party. In the survey, 784 responses were recorded within this criterion.
These responses were then divided into four categories each dependent upon the age of the
respondent, and a mean estimation with a 95% confidence interval was taken of this data set. The
result of this data showed a mean of 4.33 favorability for respondents under 30, a 4.28
favorability for those aged 30 and 45, a 4.92 favorability for those aged 46 to 60, and a 5.20
favorability of respondents aged over 60. These results indicate slightly unfavorable feelings of
most Independents towards the Democratic Party, with the only crossover towards a slightly
favorable view of the party occurring in those over the age of 60. While the favorability of
Independents towards the Democratic Party generally increases as respondents increase in age,
there is a slight dip in favorability between respondent groups under 30 to those from ages 30
and 45. Data for Test 2 is listed under Appendix A.
Test 3: Republicans Feeling Towards Democratic Party
The third test measured the feelings of respondents who self-identified as Republicans
towards the Democratic Party. In the survey, 2,911 responses were recorded within this criterion.
These responses were then divided into four categories each dependent upon the age of the
respondent, and a mean estimation with a 95% confidence interval was taken of this data set. The
result of this data showed a mean of 2.76 favorability for respondents under 30, a 2.38
favorability for those aged 30 and 45, a 2.08 favorability for those aged 46 to 60, and a 1.96
favorability of respondents aged over 60. Overall, these results showed significantly unfavorable
views of Republicans towards the Democratic Party. These results indicate a gradual decrease in
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favorability among Republicans as the age of the respondent increased. Data for Test 3 is listed
under Appendix A.

Test 4: Democrat Feeling Towards GOP
The fourth test measured the feelings of respondents who self-identified as Democrats
towards the GOP. In the survey, 3,346 responses were recorded within this criterion. These
responses were then divided into four categories each dependent upon the age of the respondent,
and a mean estimation with a 95% confidence interval was taken of this data set. The result of
this data showed a mean of 2.19 favorability for respondents under 30, a 2.43 favorability for
those aged 30 and 45, a 2.16 favorability for those aged 46 to 60, and a 2.00 favorability of
respondents aged over 60. Overall, these results showed significantly unfavorable views of
Democrats towards the GOP. These results indicate a gradual decrease in favorability among
Democrats as the age of the respondent increased, with an exception occurring between those
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aged under 30 to those from ages 30 to 45, where favorability increased slightly. Data for Test 4
is listed under Appendix B.

Test 5: Independent Feeling Towards GOP
The fifth test measured the feelings of respondents who self-identified as Independents
towards the GOP. In the survey, 786 responses were recorded within this criterion. These
responses were then divided into four categories each dependent upon the age of the respondent,
and a mean estimation with a 95% confidence interval was taken of this data set. The result of
this data showed a mean of 4.19 favorability for respondents under 30, a 4.22 favorability for
those aged 30 and 45, a 4.38 favorability for those aged 46 to 60, and a 4.29 favorability of
respondents aged over 60. Overall, these results showed slightly unfavorable views of
Independents towards the GOP. These results indicate a very slight increase in favorability
among Independents as the age of the respondent increased, with an exception occurring between
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those aged from 46 to 60 to those older than 60, where favorability deceased slightly. Data for
Test 5 is listed under Appendix B.
Test 6: Republican Feeling Towards GOP
The sixth test measured the feelings of respondents who self-identified as Republicans
towards the GOP. In the survey, 2,913 responses were recorded within this criterion. These
responses were then divided into four categories each dependent upon the age of the respondent,
and a mean estimation with a 95% confidence interval was taken of this data set. The result of
this data showed a mean of 7.41 favorability for respondents under 30, a 7.55 favorability for
those aged 30 and 45, a 7.67 favorability for those aged 46 to 60, and a 7.95 favorability of
respondents aged over 60. Overall, these results showed significantly favorable views of
Republicans towards the GOP. These results indicate a slight increase in favorability among
Republicans as the age of the respondent increased. Data for Test 6 is listed under Appendix B.
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Overall, the differences between favorability ratings for both Republicans and Democrats
towards their own party and the opposing party are very significant. Unlike Independent feelings
towards each party, which tend to be very similar, ingroup and outgroup favorability ratings from
Democrats and Republicans display a significant disparity. In addition, when considering the
increase in age groupings, the disparity in favorability grows significantly more for partied
individuals as opposed to those who are Independents. When visually represented, these
distinctions are even more clear cut.
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Conclusion
The six tests conducted tended to support both hypotheses. The first is supported by the
general overall increase of support for one’s own self-identified party as one’s age increased.
This was seen in both Democrats, who in Test 1 had a steady rate of increased favorability for
the Democratic party as age increased, ranging from 7.29 to 8.39, and in Republicans, who in
Test 6 also displayed an increase of 7.41 to 7.95 in own-party favorability as age increased.
Furthermore, the second hypothesis is also generally supported, as both Democrats and
Republicans increasingly viewed the opposing party unfavorably as their age increased. In Test
3, Republicans displayed a decreased favorability drop from 2.76 to 1.96 of the Democratic Party
as age increased. This general decrease in adorability is also seen to a lesser extent in Test 4,
where Democrats overall increasingly held unfavorable views of the GOP as age increased,
ranging from 2.19 favorability for those under 30, to 2.00 favorability for those over 60.
As the hypotheses are generally supported, the overall conclusion from these tests is that
as those from each party increase in age, they will tend to be more affable to their own party, and
more hostile to the one across the aisle. The effect of party membership itself (the primary
indicator of partisanship in these tests) does seem to be the driving force behind this increase in
polarization. While there is a general increase in political favorability towards each party seen in
Independents as they age, the negative relationship between opposing party favorability and
one’s age indicates that party membership does play a part.
One potential criticism that may arise from this study regards the first hypothesis coupled
with the data regarding the change in favorability towards both parties by aging independents.
Tests 2 and 5 both indicated a positive relationship between Independent age and party support,
both between Independents and the Democratic Party, and between Independents and the GOP.
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This relationship could be seen as weakening of the first hypothesis, as positive relationships
between age and party favorability do not seem to be unique to those who are in a party.
However, the differences between these two areas of party support differ in significance enough
that party membership still does seem to play a role. The difference in Democratic Party
favorability across the age spectrum between Independents and Democrats is 0.87 vs 1.1,
respectively. The difference is even more drastic when comparing cross-age Independent and
Republican overall support of the GOP, with the differences being 0.1vs 0.54, respectively.
Thus, it would seem as though party still plays a role in the rate of increase in own party support
as age increases, despite an overall general increase in non-opposing party support.
There are many opportunities for further research into the subject of political polarization
and age demographics. The primary avenue of research is that of causation. While this study
does work to establish a link between political polarization and increases in age, it does not
attempt to show the origin of such increases. While political party membership itself may explain
some part of this link (as would be consistent with those who favor a psychological explanation
for political polarization), this study does not conclusively argue that this is the primary cause.
Further research would be needed to show the casual nature of this link.
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Appendix A
POST: CSES5-Q15A: LIKE-DISLIKE-DEMOCRATIC PARTY
I’d like to know what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name of a
political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that
party and 10 means that you strongly like that party. If I come to a party you haven’t heard of or
you feel you do not know enough about, just say so. The first party is: The Democratic Party
Values
0. Strongly dislike
10. Strongly like
Test 1: Democrat Feeling Towards the Democratic Party
Number of obs. = 3344
Age

Mean

Std. Err.

Under 30
30-45
46-60
Over 60

7.290841
7.35934
7.834329
8.397692

.1392848
.1116191
.1093981
.0837067

95% Conf.
Int. Min
7.017749
7.140491
7.619835
8.233571

95% Conf.
Int. Max
7.563933
7.578188
8.048823
8.561814

Test 2: Independent Feeling Towards the Democratic Party
Number of obs. = 784
Age

Mean

Std. Err.

Under 30
30-45
46-60
Over 60

4.33992
4.288705
4.925777
5.200764

.3095496
.2233313
.2705551
.2189513

95% Conf.
Int. Min
3.732275
3.850306
4.394678
4.770963

95% Conf.
Int. Max
4.947566
4.727104
5.456876
5.630565

Test 3: Republican Feeling Towards the Democratic Party
Number of obs. = 2911
Age

Mean

Std. Err.

Under 30
30-45
46-60
Over 60

2.769152
2.389018
2.081287
1.962893

.208453
.1424678
.1127148
.0982779

95% Conf.
Int. Min
2.360422
2.10967
1.860278
1.770191

95% Conf.
Int. Max
3.177883
2.668366
2.302296
2.155594
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Appendix B
POST: CSES5-Q15B: LIKE-DISLIKE-REPUBLICAN PARTY
Question Using the same scale, where would you place: The Republican Party
Values
0. Strongly dislike
10. Strongly like
Test 4: Democrat Feeling Thermometer Towards GOP
Mean estimation Number of obs. = 3346
Age

Mean

Std. Err.

Under 30
30-45
46-60
Over 60

2.196005
2.432897
2.16716
2.007143

.1348473
.1038967
.1122521
.0947557

95% Conf.
Int. Min
1.931613
2.229189
1.947071
1.821358

95% Conf.
Int. Max
2.460396
2.636604
2.38725
2.192928

Test 5: Independent Feeling Thermometer Towards GOP
Mean estimation Number of obs. = 786
Age

Mean

Std. Err.

Under 30
30-45
46-60
Over 60

4.191093
4.228339
4.380555
4.295515

.2805641
.2554767
.2475009
.2050408

95% Conf.
Int. Min
3.640348
3.72684
3.894713
3.893021

95% Conf.
Int. Max
4.741838
4.729837
4.866397
4.698008

Test 6: Republican Feeling Thermometer Towards GOP
Mean estimation Number of obs. = 2913
Age

Mean

Std. Err.

Under 30
30-45
46-60
Over 60

7.417865
7.556729
7.678873
7.951337

.1739675
.1168424
.1019777
.090299

95% Conf.
Int. Min
7.076753
7.327627
7.478917
7.774281

95% Conf.
Int. Max
7.758976
7.785831
7.878828
8.128393

